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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Court concluded that Pershing Redevelopment Corporation and
its parent corporation 50 were private entities despite the grant of emi-
nent domain; thus, their acquisitions of real property were exempt from
URA.5' Because the developer acted as a private entity, the City's re-
ceipt of federal funds was insufficient to invoke URA benefits.52
Young limits the available theories under which URA benefits might
otherwise apply. Young permits some municipal participation, with
federal financial assistance, in a redevelopment program without corre-
sponding URA coverage." The extent of municipal participation
needed to invoke URA benefits remains undefined, although the mini-
mum level of involvement must be significant.
54
Young's balancing test, which weighs the grant of eminent domain
against the private nature of the development,55 is a new judicial tool in
URA analysis. The Eighth Circuit, however, failed to articulate clearly
the factors involved in the test. The Eighth Circuit should forcefully
address these issues when it next examines the Act. Additionally, the
court in Young allowed frustration of the congressional policy behind
URA. Had these plaintiffs been displaced directly by the government,
they would have been entitled to URA benefits. By delegating the
traditional public function of eminent domain, the city thus can gain
the benefits of urban redevelopment, but avoid the compensatory costs
of URA.
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-SECTION 302(b)(3) APPLIES TO
SERIES OF CORPORATE REDEMPTIONS EVEN THOUGH REDEMPTION
PLAN IS NOT CONTRACTUALLY BINDING. Bleil' & Collishaw, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 751 (1979). Petitioner, a California corporation,
owned 225 shares of Maxdon Construction, Inc. (Maxdon), thirty per-
cent of Maxdon's outstanding stock. In order to obtain sole control and
50. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
51. 599 F.2d at 878.
52. Id. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
54. The City of St. Louis was extensively involved in the present case, but the court found
this participation insufficient to make the project a joint undertaking. Id.
55. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
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ownership of the corporation, Maxdon's president, who held the re-
maing 525 shares, negotiated a purchase by Maxdon of all peti-
tioner's shares at a fixed price per share. Because the corporation
lacked sufficient cash to purchase all the shares at one time, petitioner
initially transferred only a portion of the shares. Both petitioner and
Maxdon intended to complete the redemption of the remaining shares.
Neither, however, was under any contractual or legal obligation to
complete the intended transfers. During the following six months,'
Maxdon completed the purchase of the remaining stock, terminating
petitioner's interest in the corporation.
Petitioner reported the proceeds of the 1973 transfers as dividends on
its 1973 corporate income tax return, availing itself of the eighty-five
percent deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) = for dividends received
by a corporation Respondent assessed a deficiency of $6,573 in peti-
tioner's income tax for 1973, asserting that the redemptions constituted
distributions in exchange for stock and so were taxable as capital gains.
The Tax Court affirmed respondent's determination and held- A series
of redemptions executed pursuant to a fixed plan to terminate a share-
holder's interest constitute the component parts of a single sale or ex-
change of the entire stock interest, even though the plan does not
contractually bind either the corporation or the shareholder."
In general, a distribution of money, securities, or other property5 by
a corporation to a shareholder (in his capacity as shareholder 6) is
1. The following six months fell within calendar years 1973 and 1974.
2. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in
effect during the years at issue.
3. See note 15 infra (discussion of certain tax advantages to corporation of treating proceeds
from redemption of stock as dividends). In the instant case, it is undisputed that Maxdon has
sufficient earnings and profits to treat each redemption as a dividend under I.R.C. § 316. Bleily &
Collishaw, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 751, 754 & n.3 (1979).
4. 72 T.C. at 756-57.
5. I.R.C. § 317(a) ("property" is defined as money, securities and any other property, but
not as stock of corporation making distribution).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(c) (1960) provides that "Section 301 is not applicable to an amount
paid by a corporation to a shareholder unless the amount is paid to the shareholder in his capacity
as such." I.R.C. §§ 301(a) and 301(c) provide that in general the amount of any distribution by a
corporation to a shareholder which is treated as a dividend (within the meaning of§ 316(a)) shall
be included in the shareholder's gross income.
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treated as a dividend.7 The amount of the distribution is therefore in-
cludible in the gross income of the shareholder,8 and is taxable at the
rates applicable to ordinary income. 9 Redemption,' 0 however, may be
treated under certain circumstances as a distribution in part or full or a
payment in exhange for the stock." Section 302(b)(3), in particular,
provides that "if the redemption is in complete redemption of all the
stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder,"' 2 it is an exchange.
As a result of this classification, the distribution is taxed as a capital
gain rather than as ordinary income." Because of the applicability of
lower rates to capital gains as compared to ordinary income,'4 the
shareholder's tax liability will normally be substantially reduced if the
redemption qualifies under section 302(b)(3).' 5
7. I.R.C. §§ 301(a), (c) (requiring inclusion in shareholder's gross income of any amount
received as dividend).
Section 316(a) defines dividend in relation to a corporation's current and accumulated earnings
and profits.
8. Id. §§ 301(a), (c). See note 5 supra.
9. I.R.C. § I (individual income tax rates); id. § 11 (corporate income tax rates).
10. Id. § 317(b) provides: "(b) Redemption of Stock-For purposes of this part, stock shall
be treated as redeemed by a corporation if the corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in
exchange for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treas-
ury stock."
11. Id. § 302(a) provides: "(a) General Rule-If a corporation redeems its stock (within the
meaning of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (4) of [section 302(b)] applies, such
redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock." If
§ 302(a) is inapplicable, the distribution is taxed under the provisions of § 301. Id. § 302(d); see
note 5 supra.
12. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). The other circumstances in which a redemption of stock shall be
treated as an exchange occur if ( 1) the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, id.
§ 302(b)(1); or (2) the redemption is "substantially disproportionate" with respect to the share-
holder, id. § 302(b)(2) (a redemption is substantially disproportionate only if immediately after
the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50% of the voting power of all classes of voting
stock, id. § 302(b)(2)(B), and shareholder's proportionate ownership of voting stock outstanding
after the redemption is less than 80% of shareholder's proportionate ownership of voting stock
outstanding before the redemption, id. § 302(b)(2)(C)); or (3) the redemption is of certain specifi-
cally defined railroad corporation stock, id. § 302(b)(4).
13. See generall), id. §§ 1201, 1202, 1221-1223 (selected capital gains provisions).
14. See notes 9, 12 .supra.
15. The tax on a § 301 "dividend" distribution, however, may be lower than the capital gain
tax on an exchange if (1) the shareholder is itself a corporation (as Bleily), thereby entitled to the
85% dividends received deduction of I.R.C. § 243(a)(1), see, e.g., Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957) (taxpayer successfully argued that distribution from
corporation was not sale resulting in long term capital gain but rather was essentially equivalent to
dividend under § 115(g) of 1939 Code, predecessor of § 302(b)(1)); or (2) the redeeming corpora-
tion has no earnings and profits, in which case the distribution will be taxable only insofar as it
exceeds the taxpayer's basis in all shares held prior to redemption, I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(2), (3). B.
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Courts have granted taxpayers favorable 302(b)(3) treatment in cases
in which the termination of the shareholder's interest in the corporation
occurred through a series of redemptions rather than merely through a
single exchange. In these instances, however, section 302(b)(3) treat-
ment is predicated upon a finding that the redemptions were executed
pursuant to a "firm and fixed" plan in which the various transactions
had been integrated in order to effect a complete termination of the
shareholder's ownership interest in the corporation. 16 The plan need
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch.
9, 9.20 & n.1 (3d ed. 1971). Should the redemption be treated as a sale or exchange, gain
apparently must be recognized only to the extent that the distribution exceeds the basis of the
shares redeemed. See generally id.
16. Lisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976). In Lisle the corporation agreed to
repurchase all of shareholders' stock in installments over a period not to exceed twenty years. The
court held such an agreement effectuated a complete termination of the shareholders' interest for
the purpose of § 302(b)(3), notwithstanding that the corporation was obligated to repurchase
shares only when doing so would not reduce its earned surplus below that required by state corpo-
rate law, and that as security for the corporate obligation the shareholder retained legal title to the
unredeemed shares as well as the right to vote all such shares. See also Estate of Mathis v. Com-
missioner, 47 T.C. 248 (1966) (accrued but undeclared dividends on preferred stock, payable in
installments in accordance with a binding purchase agreement in which corporation agreed to
redeem all of shareholder's preferred stock, taxable as capital gain). Similarly, several cases have
held that in instances in which there was a firm, fixed, integrated plan intended to effect a substan-
tially disproportionate redemption of the shareholder's interest, a series of redemptions might be
treated as a single exchange for purposes of§ 302(b)(2); or in cases in which there was such a plan
intended to effect a complete termination of a shareholder's interest, a series of redemptions might
be treated as not essentially equivalent to a dividend, under § 302(b)(1) or § I 15(g) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 (the statutory predecessor of § 302(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954). See, e.g., Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964) (two distributions in re-
demption of portion of shareholder's preferred stock held not essentially equivalent to dividend
under § 302(b)(1) because taxpayer's aggregate ownership interest in corporation was reduced by
five percent), rev'g 41 T.C. 62 (1963); Estate of Lukens v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 403 (3rd Cir.
1957) (capital gain treatment allowed on redemption of stock, if redemption greatly reduced tax-
payer's proportionate interest in the corporation, because redemption was part of an integrated
plan to terminate taxpayer's interest as shareholder, begun two years earlier via gift of some stock
to his children, and completed two years later through gift of remaining stock to the children;
distributions deemed not essentially equivalent to dividend under § 115(g) of Internal Revenue
Code of 1939), rev'g 26 T.C. 900 (1956); Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La.
1976) (capital gain treatment allowed shareholder on redemption of stock by corporation under
§ 302(b)(2), in situations in which redemption and documented intention to transfer additional
stock to various individuals and charitable organizations were parts of an integrated plan to re-
duce shareholder's stock ownership from 72% to less than 50%, since aggregate divestiture would
make redemption substantially disproportionate as to the shareholder); McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C. 82 (1969) (court granted taxpayer capital gain treatment under § 302(b)(1), holding
that distribution with respect to complete redemption of taxpayer's preferred stock, followed by
reorganization in which taxpayer exchanged common stock in same corporation for stock of dif-
ferent corporation, was not essentially equivalent to dividend since taxpayer's interest in initial
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/12
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not, as the Tax Court in Niedermeyer v. Commissioner'7 stated, be writ-
ten, communicated to others, or absolutely binding, but these factors do
tend to show the existence of the requisite plan. 8
Inability to demonstrate that a "firm and fixed" plan exists prior to
the initiation of any of the challenged distributions generally results in
the courts' refusal to treat the redemptions as a single exchange.' 9
Thus, the Tax Court in Lisle P. Commissioner" noted that "a gen-
tleman's agreement lacking written embodiment, communication, and
contractical obligations generally will not suffice"'" to establish the
existence of a firm and fixed plan. Merely planning for future redemp-
tions of all of a shareholder's stock also may be considered insufficient
to demonstrate the existence of the requisite plan. Thus, the Tax Court
in Himmel v. Commissioner22 found that even though a prior arrange-
ment existed, no firm and fixed plan existed. In Himmel only a small
portion of the shareholder's stock had been redeemed; future redemp-
tions were not obligatory, merely permissible, and dependent upon the
corporate directors' and other shareholders' desires to proceed with the
redemptions.23
corporation was completely terminated pursuant to written, binding plan which was fixed as to its
terms).
17. 62 T.C. 280 (1974), affdper curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000
(1976).
18. Id. at 292.
19. See Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974) (distribution in redemption of
portion of shareholder's stock held to be taxable as dividend; testimony by taxpayer that at time of
redemption he intended to donate all remaining shares to charity, even when supported by fact
that such donation was actually made later in same taxable year, was insufficient to establish
existence of firm and fixed plan for complete termination of shareholder's interest because alleged
plan was not in writing and because petitioner's asserted donative intent apparently had not been
communicated to anyone at time of redemption), aj'dper cur/am, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Leleux v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 408 (1970) (distributions in re-
demption of stock held to be taxable as dividends; § 302(b)(3) not applicable upon finding that
"petitioner. . . failed to prove the existence of such a plan .... [Tihe record points to a contrary
conclusion and the alleged plan appears to us to be afterthought rather than prearrangement." Id.
at 418).
20. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976).
21. Id. at 635.
22. 41 T.C. 62 (1963), rev'don other grounds, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964).
23. Id. (two distributions held taxable as dividends even though prearranged plan existed for
possible future redemptions, because conditional nature of plan and wide shareholder discretion
indicated that there was in fact no firm and fixed plan to eliminate shareholder from the corpora-
tion); accord, Benjamin v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979) ("absence of any time
framework, coupled with the wide discretion in determining when the redemption was possible,
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In BleiOy & Collishaw, Inc. v. Commissioner24 the Tax Court viewed
the existence of a firm and fixed plan as a factual question requiring the
court to focus on the substance of the transaction.25 Applying this prin-
ciple, the court found the requisite plan in the efforts of Maxdon's pres-
ident to eliminate petitioner's ownership interest in Maxdon. The court
stressed that the initiative for the redemption came from him, as the
president and only other shareholder. Furthermore, the court consid-
ered the parties' agreement to redeem all of the shares at a definite
purchase price and their expectations that the entire series of redemp-
tions be completed within a few months26 as indicative of a firm and
fixed plan.
These factors,in the court's,opinion clearly demonstrated well-de-
fined intentions and expectations on the part of both parties. Thus, the
court concluded that the ensuing redemptions were indeed component
parts of an integrated plan. Citing with approval the dictum of
Niedermeyer v. Commissioner27 that a plan need not be absolutely
binding in order to be firm and fixed,28 the court affirmatively decided
that the absence of a contractual or legal obligation to consummate the
intended redemptions did not preclude a finding of a "firm and fixed"
plan to terminate through a series of redemptions.29
The Tax Court in Bleiy & Collishaw, Inc. correctly determined the
existence of a firm, fixed plan for effecting the redemption of peti-
vested in the taxpayers as directors," id. at 1261, led to the conclusion that no firm or fixed plan
actually existed), aj7'g 66 T.C. 1084 (1976).
24. 72 T.C. 751 (1979).
25. Id. at 756.
26. Id. at 757. The significance of the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the alleged plan prior
to the time of court review is unclear, though review of the parties' actions subsequent to initiation
of the purported plan has not been uncommon. Compare Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.
280 (1974), a~f'd per cur/am, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), and Him-
mel v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 62 (1963) (apparent failure to make any additional redemptions,
after two partial redemptions consummated, was one factor supporting finding that no fixed or
firm plan to terminate shareholder's entire interest in corporation actually existed), wi/h Lisle v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976) (plan to eliminate shareholders' entire interest in
corporation via installment sale with 20-year payout period found to constitute firm and fixed plan
when distributions made conformed to plan terms, even though at time of review much of plan
was not yet fulfilled). See also Leleux v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 408, 419 & n.5 (1970) (resting its
decision upon other grounds, the court expressly refrained from comment upon potential applica-
tion of § 302(b)(3) when shareholder had not completely terminated his interest in corporation
even at time of trial).
27. 62 T.C. 280, affdper cur/am, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
28. 62 T.C. at 292.
29. 72 T.C. at 756-57.
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tioner's entire stock holdings. The court was similarly correct in hold-
ing that the absence of a binding obligation to complete the redemption
need not prevent the finding of a firm and fixed plan, especially in cases
in which the final termination of the taxpayer's interest has been com-
pleted exactly as originally contemplated.
Blei, & Collishaw, Inc.'s primary significance lies in its illumination
of the planning pitfalls that each taxpayer may encounter in an attempt
to use redemption to completely terminate an interest. The impact on
those relatively few taxpayers who would benefit from having redemp-
tive distributions taxed as dividends is clear: the mere absence of a
contractually binding obligation to complete a plan of serial redemp-
tions will not necessarily insulate the redemptions from capital gain
treatment under section 302(a). Thus, additional planning is required
to ensure that anticipated distributions will be taxed as dividends
rather than as capital gains.
For the majority of taxpayers who seek the advantages of capital
gain treatment afforded by the safe harbor provisions of section
302(b),30 the significance of the case is less obvious. The decision does
provide clear, direct authority for the proposition that section 302(b)(3)
may be properly applied to a series of corporate redemptions, even
though the redemption plan is not contractually binding, provided the
firm and fixed nature of the plan is otherwise established. On the other
hand, Bleiy & Collishaw, Inc. did not overrule any previous case but
merely extended prior decisions.3' Thus, it is likely that redemption
plans that are not contractually binding will continue to be successfully
challenged in the courts by the Commissioner, and if the Commissioner
prevails will result in distributions being taxed as dividends rather than
as capital gains. Consequently, prudent planning for redemptions, in
anticipation of insuring favorable treatment under the provisions of
section 302, mandates continued use of firm and fixed plans of redemp-
tion. These plans should include binding agreements, unless non-tax
factors preclude the use of a binding obligation in the particular factual
situation.
30. See note 16 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
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